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Matching structure and the cultural transmission of social norms

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  • Mengel, Friederike

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 67 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (September)
Pages: 608-623

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:67:y:2008:i:3-4:p:608-623

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. K. Schlag, 2010. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 454, David K. Levine.
  2. Nyborg, Karine & Rege, Mari, 2003. "On social norms: the evolution of considerate smoking behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 323-340, November.
  3. Friederike Mengel & Veronika Grimm, 2007. "Group Selection With Imperfect Separation - An Experiment," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  4. Roger B. Myerson, 1990. "Viscous Population Equilibria," Discussion Papers 906, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner, 1998. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 193-209, February.
  6. Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," Working Paper Series 476, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  7. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Social norms and economic welfare1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 821-830, May.
  8. Schotter, Andrew & Weiss, Avi & Zapater, Inigo, 1996. "Fairness and survival in ultimatum and dictatorship games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 37-56, October.
  9. Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 389, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2006.
  10. Charles F. Manski, 2004. "Social Learning from Private Experiences: The Dynamics of the Selection Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 443-458.
  11. Alberto Alesina & Nichola Fuchs Schuendeln, 2005. "Good bye Lenin (or not?): The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences," NBER Working Papers 11700, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, . "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  13. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
  14. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
  15. Joel M. GUTTMAN, 2001. "Families, Markets and Self-Enforcing Reciprocity Norms," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 63-64, pages 89-110.
  16. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
  17. Henrich, Joseph, 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 3-35, January.
  18. Huck, Steffen, 1998. "Trust, Treason, and Trials: An Example of How the Evolution of Preferences Can Be Driven by Legal Institutions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 44-60, April.
  19. Joel M. Guttman, 2003. "Repeated interaction and the evolution of preferences for reciprocity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 631-656, 07.
  20. Friederike Mengel & Veronika Grimm, 2007. "Cooperation In Viscous Populations - Experimental Evidence," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  21. Guttman, Joel M., 2001. "Self-enforcing reciprocity norms and intergenerational transfers: theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 117-151, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mengel, Friederike, 2008. "Learning by (limited) forward looking players," Research Memorandum 053, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2011. "Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner's dilemma game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 333-348, May.
  3. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William S., 2013. "Endogenous coordination and discoordination games: Multiculturalism and assimilation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 176-191.
  4. Riener, Gerhard & Traxler, Christian, 2012. "Norms, moods, and free lunch: Longitudinal evidence on payments from a Pay-What-You-Want restaurant," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 476-483.
  5. Sergio Currarini & Friederike Menge, 2012. "Identity, Homophily and In-Group Bias," Working Papers 2012.37, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Olcina Vauteren Gonzalo & Calabuig Alcántara Vicente, 2007. "Cooperation and Cultural Transmission in a Coordination Game," Working Papers 201066, Fundacion BBVA / BBVA Foundation.
  7. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2009. "Cooperation in viscous populations--Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 202-220, May.
  8. Claudio J. Tessone & Angel Sanchez & Frank Schweitzer, . "Diversity-induced resonance in the response to social norms," Working Papers ETH-RC-12-017, ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design.

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