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Cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

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  • Potters, J.J.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Suetens, S.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

We conduct a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in finitely repeated two-player games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in the case of strategic substitutes. The difference is to some extent driven by a difference in the speed with which some pairs reach stable full cooperation, but mainly by differences in choices of pairs that do not succeed in reaching full cooperation. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Potters, J.J.M. & Suetens, S., 2009. "Cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes," Other publications TiSEM 694e692f-f551-421e-8cf0-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:694e692f-f551-421e-8cf0-a49c956531cf
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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