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The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory

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Author Info
Dufwenberg, Martin () (Department of Economics)
Norde, Henk (Department of Econometrics)
Reijnierse, Hans (Department of Econometrics)
Tijs, Stef (CentER for Economic Research)

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Abstract

We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 1998:11.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 07 May 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2001, pages 119-131.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:1998_011

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Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
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Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
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Related research
Keywords: Consistency; set-valued solutions; normative game theory;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Voorneveld, Mark, 2002. "Preparation and toolkit learning," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 485, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Voorneveld, Mark & Kets, Willemien & Norde, Henk, 2005. "An axiomatization of minimal curb sets," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 589, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 18 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

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