Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dufwenberg, Martin

    ()
    (Department of Economics)

  • Norde, Henk

    (Department of Econometrics)

  • Reijnierse, Hans

    (Department of Econometrics)

  • Tijs, Stef

    (CentER for Economic Research)

Abstract

We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 1998:11.

as in new window
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 07 May 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2001, pages 119-131.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:1998_011

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Email:
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Consistency; set-valued solutions; normative game theory;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2008. "Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 610-627, March.
  2. Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December.
  3. Voorneveld, Mark & Kets, Willemien & Norde, Henk, 2005. "An axiomatization of minimal curb sets," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 589, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 18 Mar 2005.
  4. Mosquera, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Garcia-Jurado, I. & Voorneveld, M., 2008. "Characterizing cautious choice," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-303496, Tilburg University.
  5. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2003. "Reflections on Equilibrium: Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 20, pages 257-302.
  6. Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.
  7. Voorneveld, Mark, 2002. "Preparation and toolkit learning," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 485, Stockholm School of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:1998_011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Katarina Grönvall).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.