The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory
AbstractWe extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number 1998-11.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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Postal: UPPSALA UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, S-751 20 UPPSALA SWEDEN.
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Other versions of this item:
- Dufwenberg, M. & Norde, H.W. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Tijs, S.H., 2001. "The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-86781, Tilburg University.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Norde, Henk & Reijnierse, Hans & Tijs, Stef, 1998. "The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory," Working Paper Series 1998:11, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Voorneveld, M. & Kets, W. & Norde, H.W., 2005.
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- Mark Voorneveld & Willemien Kets & Henk Norde, 2005. "An axiomatization of minimal curb sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 479-490, November.
- Mark Voorneveld & Willemien Kets & Henk Norde, 2006. "An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 153-153, April.
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urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-303496, Tilburg University.
- Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.
- Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December.
- Voorneveld, Mark, 2002. "Preparation and toolkit learning," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 485, Stockholm School of Economics.
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