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The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory


Author Info

  • Dufwenberg, M.
  • Norde, H.
  • Reijnierse, H.
  • Tijs, S.


We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number 1998-11.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:uppaal:1998-11

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Keywords: GAME THEORY;

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Cited by:
  1. Voorneveld, Mark & Kets, Willemien & Norde, Henk, 2005. "An axiomatization of minimal curb sets," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 589, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 18 Mar 2005.
  2. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, . "Reflections on Equilibrium - Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  3. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2008. "Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 610-627, March.
  4. Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December.
  5. Voorneveld, Mark, 2002. "Preparation and toolkit learning," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 485, Stockholm School of Economics.
  6. Mosquera, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Garcia-Jurado, I. & Voorneveld, M., 2008. "Characterizing cautious choice," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-303496, Tilburg University.
  7. Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.


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