• NEP-ALL-2002-06-13 (All new papers)
• NEP-GTH-2002-07-04 (Game Theory)

1. Damme, E. van & Weibull, J.W., 1998. "Evolution with mutations driven by control costs," Discussion Paper 94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Van Damme, E. & Weibull, J.W., 1998. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 501, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
   • Eric Van Damme & Jorgen W Weibull, 1999. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2113, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Weibull, Jörgen W. & van Damme, Eric, 1998. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Working Paper Series 501, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Theodore C. Bergstrom, . "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 14-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Theodore C. Bergstrom, . "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 14-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   • Ted Bergstrom, 2001. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp14-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
4. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata," Working papers 90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
   Other versions:
   • Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Game Played by Finite Automata," Papers 9131, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   • Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata," Papers 90-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
6. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
7. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
   Other versions:
   • Vega-Redondo, F., 1996. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Papers 96-05, Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas.
8. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers iewwp010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   • Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
9. Philip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 162, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Johnson, Philip & Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2001. "Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 1-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Kirman, Alan, 1993. "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 137-56, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • David K Levine, 1997. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2047, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
12. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
13. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996. [Downloadable!]
    • Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
15. repec:att:wimass:199612r is not listed on IDEAS
16. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
17. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sobel, Joel, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1181-93, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Yong Gwan Kim & Joel Sobel, 1992. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    • Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
19. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2122, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
21. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. E. Maskin & D. Fudenberg, 1984. "The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information," Working papers 310, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.

Cited by:
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1. Oriana Bandiera (STICERD & LSE, 2004. "Relative and Absolute Incentives: Evidence on Worker Productivity," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 277, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2004. "Relative and Absolute Incentives: Evidence on Worker Productivity," CEPR Discussion Papers 4431, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. David K Levine & Balázs Szentes, 2006. "Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001015, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]