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Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection

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Author Info
Theodore C. Bergstrom

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Abstract

How selfish does our evolutionary history suggest that humans will be? We explore models in which groups are formed and dissolved and where reproduction of individuals is determined by their payoffs in a game played within groups. If groups are formed "randomly" and reproductive success of group founders is determined by a multiperson prisoners' dilemma game, then selfish behavior will prevail over maximization of group payoffs. However, interesting models exist in which "group selection" sustains cooperative behavior. Forces that support cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity and punishment-based group norms.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 16 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Pages: 67-88
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:16:y:2002:i:2:p:67-88

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  1. Avner Shaked & Ilan Eshel & Emilia Sansone, 1999. "The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 447-463. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. repec:att:wimass:199612r is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
  6. Joseph Henrich, 2000. "Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 973-979, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Joseph Henrich et al., 2001. "In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 73-78, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Theodore C. Bergstrom, . "The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation," University of California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics 13-01, California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers iewwp010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sebastian Kranz, 2006. "Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000092, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Weibull, Jörgen & Salomonsson, Marcus, 2005. "Natural selection and social preferences," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 588, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 20 Jul 2005.
  3. Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Game Theory and Information 0412005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Thierry Vignolo, 2003. "Reputation by imitation: an evolutionary chain-store game with strategic matching," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(4), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
  5. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7630, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Wilson Perez, 2003. "Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power and Wealth Distribution," Grand Coalition 17, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
  7. David Levine & Balázs Szentes, 2006. "Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 1(1), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  8. Werner Güth & Vittoria Levati & Georg von Wangenheim, 2004. "Relatives Versus Neighbors - An Experiment Studying Spontaneous Social Exchange -," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-33, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  9. Herold, Florian, 2003. "Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences," Discussion Papers in Economics 40, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. C. Cordes & P. J. Richerson & R. McElreath & P. Strimling, 2006. "A Naturalistic Approach to the Theory of the Firm: The Role of Cooperation and Cultural Evolution," Papers on Econonmics and Evolution 2006-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group. [Downloadable!]
  11. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Altruistic Versus Spiteful Behavior in a Public Good Game," Working Papers 309, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised May 2007. [Downloadable!]
  12. Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Equilibrium Vengeance," MPRA Paper 4321, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Thierry Vignolo, 2007. "Imitation and Selective Matching in Reputational Games," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/31, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  14. Paschalis Arvanitidis, 2006. "A Framework of Socioeconomic Organisation: Redefining Original Institutional Economics Along Critical Realist Philosophical Lines," ERSA conference papers ersa06p575, European Regional Science Association. [Downloadable!]
  15. Olivier Bochet & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2005. "Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments," Working Papers 2005-09, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Jens Josephson & Karl Wärneryd, 2004. "Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Riechmann, Thomas, 2002. "Relative Payoffs and Evolutionary Spite. Evolutionary Equilibria in Games with Finitely Many Players," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-260, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Alan Manning, 2007. "Respect," CEP Discussion Papers dp0793, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  19. Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberley, 2003. "Viable Tax Constitutions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 683, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. Wilson Perez, 2004. "Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution," Working Papers 2004.33, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  21. Ofer H. Azar, 2003. "What sustains social norms and how they evolve? The case of tipping," Others 0309001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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