On the level of cooperative behavior in a local-interaction model
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie.
Volume (Year): 71 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
evolution; local interaction; cooperation; prisoner's dilemma; Markov processes; C78;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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