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Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation

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Author Info
Karandikar, Rajeeva
Mookherjee, Dilip
Ray, Debraj
Vega-Redondo, Fernando

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45J5B77-2B/2/d2cdfbf13b8a41eaf1b7833a4179ca8f
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 80 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 292-331
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:80:y:1998:i:2:p:292-331

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Lones Smith & Ennio Stacchetti, 2002. "Aspirational Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0201003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alexander Tieman & Harold Houba & Gerard Laan, 2000. "On the level of cooperative behavior in a local-interaction model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 1-30, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1997. "- Unfolding Social Hierarchies In Large Population Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  4. H. Peyton Young, 2008. "Learning by Trial and Error," Economics Series Working Papers 384, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Mikhael Shor, 2003. "Learning to Respond: The Use of Heuristics in Dynamic Games," Game Theory and Information 0301001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Friederike Mengel, 2007. "Learning Across Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  7. John Duffy, 2004. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Computational Economics 0412001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Carlo Altavilla & Luigi Luini & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2005. "Social Learning in Market Games," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 003, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Dziubinski, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep, 2007. "Endogenous selection of aspiring and rational rules in coordination games," MPRA Paper 5941, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Francesco Feri, 2005. "Stochastic Stability in Network with Decay," Working Papers 2005.40, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  11. Francesco Feri, 2005. "Network Formation with Endogenous Decay," Working Papers 2005.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  12. Paul Frijters & Alexander F. Tieman, 1999. "The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-053/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2003. "No Switchbacks: Rethinking Aspiration-Based Dynamics in the Ultimatum Game," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0218r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco & Luca Zarri, 2004. "Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 165-194, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. F. de Vries, 1999. "The Behavioral Firm and Its Internal Game: Evolutionary Dynamics of Decision Making," Working Papers ir99036, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  16. Jonathan Bendor & Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2001. "Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(advances/), pages 1008-1008. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Dean P Foster & Peyton Young, 2006. "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000676, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  18. Tilman Börgers & Rajiv Sarin, . "Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspiration," ELSE working papers 037, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
  19. Niall O'Higgins & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2006. "Are Imitative Strategies Game Specific? Experimental Evidence from Market Games," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 011, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
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