This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Convergence of Aspirations and (Partial) Cooperation in the Prisoners's Dilemma

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Palomino, F.
Vega, F.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper proposes an aspiration-based model of bounded rationality, which is applied to a large-population context where agents are re-matched every period to play a Prisoner's Dilemma.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 345.96.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:345.96

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona
Phone: 34 93 592 1203
Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Xavier Vila).

Related research
Keywords: GAME THEORY; INFORMATION;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marcin Dziubinski & Jaideep Roy, 2007. "Endogenous Selection of Aspiring and Rational rules in Coordination Games," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 07-14, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Huw D. Dixon & Paolo Lupi, . "Learning with a Known Average: A Simulation Study of Alternative Learning Rules," Discussion Papers 97/18, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Carlo Altavilla & Luigi Luini & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2005. "Social Learning in Market Games," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 003, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco & Luca Zarri, 2004. "Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 165-194, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The RePEc project started in 1997. Its precursor, NetEc, dates back to 1993.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.