The Evolution of Fairness under an Assortative Matching Rule in the Ultimatum Game
AbstractThis paper studies how a matching rule affects the evolution of fairness in an ultimatum mini game. Gale et al.  show that only selfish behaviour survives in the deterministic replicator dynamics under the random matching rule. In contrast, this paper shows that, under an assortative matching rule, the fair behaviour may survive at an asymptotically stable state.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2008-12.
Length: 15 p.
Date of creation: Dec 2008
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-05-09 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2009-05-09 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-05-09 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-05-09 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
- Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1997.
"Assortative Matching and Search,"
97-2a, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Alp Atakan, 2005.
"Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs,"
2005 Meeting Papers
218, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Binmore,K. & McCarthy,J. & Ponti,G. & ..., 1999.
"A backward induction experiment,"
34, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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