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Economics and the Theory of Games

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  • Vega-Redondo,Fernando

Abstract

This textbook offers a systematic, self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics. Starting with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations, the discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts, their main refinements, games played under incomplete information, and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, there is a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics, e.g. oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination failures, bargaining, insurance markets, implementation theory, signaling and auctions. The theory and applications covered in the first part of the book fall under the so-called 'classical' approach to game theory, which is founded on the paradigm of players' unlimited rationality. The second part shifts towards topics that no longer abide by that paradigm. This leads to the study of topics such as the interplay between evolution and rationality.

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Bibliographic Info

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This book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9780521772518 and published in 2003.

Order: http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521772518
Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521772518

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Cited by:
  1. Gintis, Herbert, 2009. "The local best response criterion: An epistemic approach to equilibrium refinement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 89-97, August.
  2. Theys, Christophe & Notteboom, Theo E. & Pallis, Athanasios A. & De Langen, Peter W., 2010. "The economics behind the awarding of terminals in seaports: Towards a research agenda," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 37-50.
  3. Mengel, Friederike & Fosco, Constanza, 2007. "Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks," MPRA Paper 5258, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Ni, Debing & Li, Kevin W. & Tang, Xiaowo, 2009. "Production costs, scope economies, and multi-client outsourcing under quantity competition," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 130-140, September.
  5. Yasuhiro Shirata, 2012. "The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-21, February.
  6. Akamatsu, Takashi & Takayama, Yuki & Ikeda, Kiyohiro, 2009. "Spatial Discounting, Fourier, and Racetrack Economy: A Recipe for the Analysis of Spatial Agglomeration Models," MPRA Paper 21738, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 Dec 2009.
  7. repec:dgr:uvatin:2005085 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Gömöri, András, 2005. "Nyugdíjrendszer és játékelmélet. Megjegyzések Mészáros József cikkéhez
    [The pension system and game theory. Remarks on the article by József Mészáros]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 732-742.
  9. Romero, José Gabriel & Kovarik, Jaromir & Mengel, Friederike, 2012. "Learning in Network Games," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2012-66, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  10. Jost, Jürgen & Li, Wei, 2005. "Individual strategies in complementarity games and population dynamics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 345(1), pages 245-266.
  11. Ortmann, Andreas & Rydval, Ondrej, 2004. "Decisions, uncertainty, and the brain. The science of neuroeconomics, Paul W. Glimcher; The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2003, pages 375, ISBN 0-262-07244-0 (hbk), $37.95," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 891-894, December.
  12. repec:wut:journl:v:3:y:2013:id:1089 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Mateusz Zawisza & Bogumil Kaminski, 2013. "Price patterns in an oligopoly with switching cost and uncertain demand," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 3, pages 71-89.
  14. Luthi, Leslie & Pestelacci, Enea & Tomassini, Marco, 2008. "Cooperation and community structure in social networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(4), pages 955-966.
  15. Seung Han Yoo, 2014. "Learning a Population Distribution," Discussion Paper Series 1401, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  16. Bruni, Camilla & Nuño, Juan Carlos & Primicerio, Mario, 2013. "What if criminals optimize their choice? Optimal strategies to defend public goods," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(4), pages 840-850.
  17. Jan Hanousek & Evzen Kocenda, 2005. "Learning by Bidding: Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Experiment," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp247, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  18. Kocsis, Viktória, 2005. "A hálózatok közötti aszimmetria hatása a mobilszolgáltatók végződtetési díjára
    [The effect of asymmetry among networks on the provision charges of mobile telephone services]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 663-685.
  19. Ianni, Antonella, 2014. "Learning strict Nash equilibria through reinforcement," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 148-155.
  20. Buesser, Pierre & Peña, Jorge & Pestelacci, Enea & Tomassini, Marco, 2011. "The influence of tie strength on evolutionary games on networks: An empirical investigation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(23), pages 4502-4513.

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