The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
AbstractThis paper explores the quantitative relation between non random, assortative matching and the maintenance of cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics. We consider a population of individuals who are \hardwired" to play either cooperate or defect. They meet other individuals according to some random process and play their programmed strategy in a game of Prisoners' Dilemma. The type that gets the higher expected payoff reproduces more rapidly. We deÂ¯ne an index of assortativity of encounters and develop an \algebra of assortative encounters." In one set of applications, we calculate the index of assortativity for games between relatives with either cultural or genetic inheritance and we show the logical connection between the index of assortativity and Hamilton's theory of kin selection . We also apply the index of assortativity to determine the population dynamics when players select their partners, using partially informative cues about each others' types.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara in its series University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series with number qt8fm2t3nf.
Date of creation: 25 Jul 2001
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Algebra; Assortative; Encounters; Evolution; Cooperation;
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- Ted Bergstrom & Oded Stark, .
"How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment,"
_024, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
- Bergstrom, Theodore C & Stark, Oded, 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 149-55, May.
- Theodore C. Bergstrom & Oded Stark, 1994. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," Microeconomics 9401001, EconWPA.
- Bergstrom, T.C. & Stark, O., 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," Papers 93-01, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1990.
"Viscous Population Equilibria,"
906, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ted Bergstrom, .
"On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings,"
_023, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
- Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March.
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, . "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," ELSE working papers 017, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Bergstrom, Ted, 2001. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt2bh2x16r, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
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