Other Regarding Preferences: Outcomes, Intentions, or Interdependence
AbstractThe Ultimatum Game seems to be the ideal experiment to test for the structure of preferences or the sequential rationality assumptions underlying subgame perfection. We study the theoretical implications of introducing the possibility of misconceptions - that actions may potentially affect continuation payoffs - and show that the set of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria does not converge to the subgame perfect equilibrium when the possibility of misconception approaches zero. The perfect equilibria studied corresponds qualitatively to the experimental findings of offers made and unfair offers rejected.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number peters-07-03-31-11-46-48.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 31 Mar 2007
Date of revision: 24 Jun 2009
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ulitmatum game; asymmetric information; interdependent preferences;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-04-09 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-04-09 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-04-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2007-04-09 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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- Erik O. Kimbrough & Alexander Vostroknutov, 2013. "Norms Make Preferences Social," Discussion Papers dp13-01, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
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