Bargaining Piecemeal or All at Once?
AbstractPerfect-information, Rubinstein-style bargaining models are used to explore questions about multiple-issue bargaining--is it ever sensible to offer on only a subset of the issues being bargained? What is the effect of limiting offers so that they must cover all issues? We conclude that in realistic settings the answer to the first question is yes and that restricting offers to those covering all issues may be harmful to one or both parties.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 111 (2001)
Issue (Month): 473 (July)
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