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Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model

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Author Info
Weibull, Jörgen W. () (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)
Saez-Marti, Maria () (Stockholm School of Economics)

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Abstract

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (1993b)bargaining model. It turns out that "cleverness" in this respect indeed does have an advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 507.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 09 Nov 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, pages 268-279.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0507

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Related research
Keywords: Evolution Bargaining Bounded rationality Game theory

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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  1. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Altruistic Versus Spiteful Behavior in a Public Good Game," Working Papers 309, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised May 2007. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2000. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 358, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. repec:att:wimass:19199937 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Kevin Hasker, 2004. "The Emergent Seed : Simplifying the Analysis of Dynamic Evolution," Departmental Working Papers 0406, Bilkent University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 1269, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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