Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model
AbstractIn the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (1993b)bargaining model. It turns out that "cleverness" in this respect indeed does have an advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 507.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 09 Nov 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, pages 268-279.
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Evolution; Bargaining; Bounded rationality; Game theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1999. "Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 268-279, June.
- Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1998. "Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 281, Stockholm School of Economics.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-01-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-1999-01-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-1999-01-18 (Microeconomics)
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