Clever agents in adaptive learning
AbstractSaez-Marti and Weibull  investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's  bargaining model. This is how they introduce ''cleverness'' of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that Young's  prediction is robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategies distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 403.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 03 Oct 2000
Date of revision:
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Evolution; game theory; bounded rationality; Markov chain; stochastic stability;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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