Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Clever agents in adaptive learning

Contents:

Author Info

  • Matros, Alexander

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce ''cleverness'' of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that Young's [9] prediction is robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategies distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0403.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 403.

as in new window
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 03 Oct 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0403

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46-(0)8-736 90 00
Fax: +46-(0)8-31 01 57
Email:
Web page: http://www.hhs.se/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Evolution; game theory; bounded rationality; Markov chain; stochastic stability;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Weibull, Jörgen W. & Saez-Marti, Maria, 1998. "Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 507, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  2. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
  3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  4. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
  5. Basu, K. & Weibull, J., 1990. "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behavior," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper 62, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  6. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a Public Good game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 642-656.
  2. Josephson, Jens, 2009. "Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1543-1554, August.
  3. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 309, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008.
  4. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2009. "Limit Behavior of No-regret Dynamics," Discussion Papers 21, Kyiv School of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0403. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helena Lundin).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.