Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model
AbstractIn the models of Young (1993a, b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myiopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (1993b) bargaining model. It turns out that "cleverness" in this respect indeed does have an advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 86 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Weibull, Jörgen W. & Saez-Marti, Maria, 1998. "Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Working Paper Series 507, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1998. "Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 281, Stockholm School of Economics.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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