Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 57 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
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