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• Thomas Troger

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 102 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 375-402
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:102:y:2002:i:2:p:375-402

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Thomas Troger, 2002. "Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 19-02, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Thomas Troger, 2002. "Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp19-02, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
2. Ferdinand von Siemens, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Papers 57, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
3. Kareen Rozen, 2008. "A ‘Dual’-Improved Shortcut to the Long Run," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1643, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Rozen, Kareen, 2008. "A 'Dual'-Improved Shortcut to the Long Run," Working Papers 41, Yale University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Kareen Rozen, 2008. "A ‘Dual’-Improved Shortcut to the Long Run," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002080, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Christian Ewerhart, . "The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers Bargaining between Inequity-Averse Agents," IEW - Working Papers iewwp203, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
6. Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Papers in Economics 518, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.