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An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning

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  • Drew Fudenberg
  • David K Levine

Abstract

We comment on the Shoham, Powers, and Grenager survey of multi-agent learning and game theory, emphasizing that some of their categories are important for economics and others are not. We also try to correct some minor imprecisions in their discussion of the economics literature on learning in games.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 784828000000000683.

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Date of creation: 05 Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000683

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Tilman B�rgers & Rajiv Sarin, . "Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspiration," ELSE working papers 037, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  2. Ed Hopkins, . "Learning, Matching and Aggregation," Discussion Papers 1996-2, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  3. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September.
  4. A. Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg, 2010. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 425, David K. Levine.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
  6. Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2010. "Learning To Play Games In Extensive Form By Valuation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000034, David K. Levine.
  7. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata," Papers 90-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-73, May.
  9. K. Schlag, 2010. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 454, David K. Levine.
  10. Timothy C. Salmon, 2001. "An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1597-1628, November.
  11. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
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