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Learning to Play Bayesian Games

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  • Dekel, Eddie
  • Fudenberg, Drew
  • Levine, David

Abstract

This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of games with a move by Nature. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning about the opponents' strategies. A second goal is to argue that quite restrictive assumptions are necessary to justify the concept of Nash equilibrium without a common prior as a steady state of a learning process.

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File URL: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3200612/fudenberg_Bayesiangames.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 3200612.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior
Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:3200612

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References

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-73, May.
  2. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  3. Cox, James C. & Shachat, Jason & Walker, Mark, 2001. "An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 11-33, January.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
  5. Thomas Piketty, 1994. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 94-15, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September.
  7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine.
  8. Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1997. "Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games," Scholarly Articles 3160492, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Jordan J. S., 1995. "Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 8-20, April.
  10. Matthew Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1138, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Mitropoulos, Atanasios, 2001. "Learning under minimal information: An experiment on mutual fate control," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 523-557, August.
  12. Abhijit Banerjee & Rohini Somanathan, 2001. "A Simple Model Of Voice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 189-227, February.
  13. David Spector, 1999. "Rational debate and one-dimensional conflict," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 99-09, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  14. Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher, 1994. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 299-311, March.
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