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Learning to Play Bayesian Games

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Author Info
Eddie Dekel
Drew Fudenberg
David K. Levine

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Abstract

This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning about the opponents' strategies. A second goal is to argue that quite restrictive assumptions are necessary to justify the concept of Nash equilibrium without a common prior as a steady state of a learning process.

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File URL: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2001/HIER1926.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 1926.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1926

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher, 1994. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 299-311, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Piketty, Thomas, 1995. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 551-84, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers 91-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. David Spector, 2000. "Rational Debate And One-Dimensional Conflict," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 181-200, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Abhijit Banerjee & Rohini Somanathan, 2001. "A Simple Model Of Voice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 189-227, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Milo Bianchi & Philippe Jehiel, 2008. "Bubbles and crashes with partially sophisticated investors," PSE Working Papers 2008-62, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  2. Alan Beggs, 2005. "Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions," Economics Series Working Papers 232, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Daisuke Oyama & Olivier Tercieux, 2007. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000210, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]
  5. Filippin, Antonio, 2003. "Discrimination and Workers' Expectations," IZA Discussion Papers 823, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Topologies on Type," Discussion Papers 1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Learning Foundations and Complexity of the Cursed Equilibrium," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-40, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  9. Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Muller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment," Discussion Papers 09/08, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2004. "Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Young's Regret Testing," Economics Working Papers 788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1073-1073. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Lupia, Arthur & Zharinova, Natasha & Levine, Adam Seth, 2007. "Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors," MPRA Paper 1618, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  13. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  14. Lupia, Arthur & Levine, Adam Seth & Zharinova, Natasha, 2008. "When Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Benefits, Costs, and an Application to Jury Theorems," MPRA Paper 8643, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief Based Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000975, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  16. Miettinen, Topi, 2008. "Analogy-based Expectations and the Partially Cursed Equilibrium," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 708, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 12 Dec 2008. [Downloadable!]
  17. Alexander Smajgl, 2004. "Modelling the effect of learning and evolving rules on the use of common-pool resources," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 178, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
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