This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Yaron Azrieli ()
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
No abstract is available for
this item.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory .
Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 209-219
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:38:y:2009:i:2:p:209-219Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Order Information: Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).
Keywords: Conjectural equilibrium ; Pure strategy equilibrium ; Non-manipulable information structure ; C72 ; References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher, 1994.
"Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 299-311, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Discussion Papers
895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Discussion Papers
925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1991.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Working Papers
91-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!] Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2004.
"Learning to play Bayesian games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 282-303, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2000.
"Learning to Play Bayesian Games ,"
Discussion Papers
1322, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jul 2001.
[Downloadable!] Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2002.
"Learning to Play Bayesian Games ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
625018000000000151, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!] Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2001.
"Learning to Play Bayesian Games ,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1926, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993.
"Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993.
"Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
373, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Gilli, Mario, 1999.
"On Non-Nash Equilibria ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 184-203, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1997.
"Social Learning in Recurring Games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 102-134, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999.
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
172, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, .
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
ELSE working papers
032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999.
"Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Papers
9-99, Tel Aviv.
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996.
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, .
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
ELSE working papers
040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
[Downloadable!] Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999.
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Ehud Kalai, 2004.
"Large Robust Games ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993.
"Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-40, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Pearce, David G, 1984.
"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .