Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

Contents:

Author Info

  • Drew Fudenberg
  • David K. Levine

Abstract

The authors study the steady states of a system in which players learn about the strategies their opponents are playing by updating their Bayesian priors in light of their observations. Players are matched.at random to play a fixed extensive-form game and each player observes the realized actions in his own matches but not the intended off-path play of his opponents or the realized actions in other matches. Because players are assumed to live finite lives, there are steady states in which learning continually takes place. If lifetimes are long and players are very patient, the steady state distribution of actions approximates those of a Nash equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/sslne.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 373.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:373

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  2. Robert J. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000377, David K. Levine.
  3. Rosenthal, R W, 1979. "Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1353-66, November.
  4. A. Rubinstein & A. Wolinsky, 2010. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 369, David K. Levine.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
  6. Bray, Margaret, 1982. "Learning, estimation, and the stability of rational expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 318-339, April.
  7. Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August.
  8. David Canning, 1989. "Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence for Games with Learning," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE 190, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  9. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:373. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.