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Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents

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Rosenthal, R W

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 47 (1979)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1353-66
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:47:y:1979:i:6:p:1353-66

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  1. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names," Working Papers 08-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Hasker, Kevin, 2000. "Social Norms and Choice: A Weak Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games," Working Papers 2000-10, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Jan Eeckhout, 2000. "Competing Norms of Cooperation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0559, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  6. Fabrizio Germano, 2007. "Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Finite Normal Form Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(4), pages 311-333, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. John R. Conlon, 2005. "Seemingly Unrelated Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Joerg Oechssler, 1994. "An Evolutionary Interpretation Of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria," Game Theory and Information 9404001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Gallice, Andrea, 2007. "Best Responding to What? A Behavioral Approach to One Shot Play in 2x2 Games," Discussion Papers in Economics 1365, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jan Eeckhout, . "Competing Norms of Cooperation," Penn CARESS Working Papers fa8d3cedc3b97259070110325, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  11. Giovanni Ponti & Robert M. Seymour, . "Conventions and Social Mobility in Bargaining Situations," ELSE working papers 034, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
  12. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining - Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game With Fixed Opponents," Experimental 9905002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Richard A. Jensen & Marie Thursby, 1990. "Tariffs with Private Information and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 2959, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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