• NEP-ALL-2003-11-09 (All new papers)
• NEP-IND-2003-11-23 (Industrial Organization)

1. Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher, 1994. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 299-311, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1991. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Discussion Papers 933, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
2. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers 91-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
3. Piketty, Thomas, 1995. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 551-84, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Thomas Piketty, 1994. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," Working papers 94-15, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
4. David Spector, 2000. "Rational Debate And One-Dimensional Conflict," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 181-200, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
   • Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999. "Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Papers 9-99, Tel Aviv.
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
   • Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium ," Working papers 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Abhijit Banerjee & Rohini Somanathan, 2001. "A Simple Model Of Voice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 189-227, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Milo Bianchi & Philippe Jehiel, 2008. "Bubbles and crashes with partially sophisticated investors," PSE Working Papers 2008-62, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
2. Alan Beggs, 2005. "Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions," Economics Series Working Papers 232, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Alan Beggs, 2009. "Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 9(1). [Downloadable!]
3. Daisuke Oyama & Olivier Tercieux, 2007. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000210, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2005. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," MPRA Paper 7734, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
4. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]
5. Filippin, Antonio, 2003. "Discrimination and Workers' Expectations," IZA Discussion Papers 823, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Filippin, Antonio, 2003. "Discrimination and Workers' Expectations," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 78, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
   • Antonio Filippin, 2003. "Discrimination and workers' expectations," Departemental Working Papers 2003-15, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy. [Downloadable!]
6. Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Topologies on Type," Discussion Papers 1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000061, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2093, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September. [Downloadable!]
8. Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Learning Foundations and Complexity of the Cursed Equilibrium," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-40, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
9. Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Muller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment," Discussion Papers 09/08, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Mueller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009. "Signaling without common prior: An experiment," Discussion Papers 2009-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
   • Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment," Discussion Paper 2009-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
10. Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2004. "Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Young's Regret Testing," Economics Working Papers 788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Germano, Fabrizio & Lugosi, Gabor, 2007. "Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 135-154, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Lupia, Arthur & Zharinova, Natasha & Levine, Adam Seth, 2007. "Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors," MPRA Paper 1618, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
12. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
13. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
14. Lupia, Arthur & Levine, Adam Seth & Zharinova, Natasha, 2008. "When Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Benefits, Costs, and an Application to Jury Theorems," MPRA Paper 8643, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
15. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief Based Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000975, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
16. Miettinen, Topi, 2008. "Analogy-based Expectations and the Partially Cursed Equilibrium," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 708, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 12 Dec 2008. [Downloadable!]
17. Alexander Smajgl, 2004. "Modelling the effect of learning and evolving rules on the use of common-pool resources," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 178, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]