Risk and evolution
AbstractI examine a Knightian (1921) model of risk using a general equilibrium model of investment and trade. A population of agents with various preference types can choose between a safe production technology and a risky production technology. In addition, the distribution of types of agents changes through a standard evolutionary dynamic. For a given population distribution, the equilibrium is in general inefficient, however, by allowing the population distribution to change in response to market generated rewards, the population will converge to one where the equilibrium is efficient and where the population as a whole behaves as if all agents were risk neutral.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: November 7, 1996; revised version: October 20, 1997
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Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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