Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Credible delegation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Corts, Kenneth S.
  • Neher, Darwin V.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-45TTSJJ-3/2/c8dfd19ced36429ff37aa84ff9acfeef
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 47 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 395-407

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:47:y:2003:i:3:p:395-407

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March.
  2. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn.
  3. McAfee, R. Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1995. "The non-existence of pairwise-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 251-259, September.
  4. Alexander, Cindy R & Reiffen, David, 1995. "Vertical Contracts as Strategic Commitments: How Are They Enforced?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(4), pages 623-49, Winter.
  5. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
  6. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
  7. Caillaud Bernard & Jullien Bruno & Picard Pierre, 1991. "Competing vertical structures : precommitment and renegotiation," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9125, CEPREMAP.
  8. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. Baye, Michael R & Crocker, Keith J & Ju, Jiandong, 1996. "Divisionalization, Franchising, and Divestiture Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 223-36, March.
  10. Gillian K. Hadfield, 1991. "Credible Spatial Preemption through Franchising," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 531-543, Winter.
  11. Schwartz, Marius & Thompson, Earl A, 1986. "Divisionalization and Entry Deterrence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 307-21, May.
  12. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-65, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004.
  2. Bru, Lluís & de Haro, José-Manuel Ordóñez & Faulí-Oller, Ramon, 2001. "Divisionalization in Vertical Structures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Juan J. Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Bargaining with commitments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 129-144, January.
  4. Kopel, Michael & Brand, Björn, 2012. "Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 982-989.
  5. Suzuki, Ayako, 2009. "Market foreclosure and vertical merger: A case study of the vertical merger between Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 532-543, July.
  6. Oystein Foros & Hans Jarle Kind & Greg Shaffer, 2007. "Resale Price Maintenance and Restrictions on Dominant Firm and Industry-Wide Adoption," CESifo Working Paper Series 2032, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Czerny, Achim & Höffler, Felix & Mun, Se-il, 2013. "Port Competition and Welfare Effect of Strategic Privatization," EWI Working Papers 2013-13, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln.
  8. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine.
  9. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Do firms' owners delegate both short-run and long-run decisions to their managers in equilibrium?," Working Papers 0815, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  10. Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg, 2004. "Opportunism and menus of two-part tariffs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(10), pages 1399-1414, December.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:47:y:2003:i:3:p:395-407. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.