This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Credible delegation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Corts, Kenneth S.
Neher, Darwin V.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-45TTSJJ-3/2/c8dfd19ced36429ff37aa84ff9acfeef
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 47 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 395-407
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:47:y:2003:i:3:p:395-407

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information 0306002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ramón Faulí-Oller & Lluís Bru & José Manuel Ordóñez de Haro, 2001. "Divisionalization In Vertical Structures," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-28, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  4. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Do firms' owners delegate both short-run and long-run decisions to their managers in equilibrium?," Working Papers 0815, University of Crete, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bru, Lluís & de Haro, José-Manuel Ordóñez & Faulí-Oller, Ramon, 2001. "Divisionalization in Vertical Structures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
  7. Oystein Foros & Hans Jarle Kind & Greg Shaffer, 2007. "Resale Price Maintenance and Restrictions on Dominant Firm and Industry-Wide Adoption," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 2700 working paper series are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.