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On the Evolution of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games

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Author Info
J. Van Huyck
R. Battalio
F. Rankin
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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/convention.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 548.

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Date of creation: 19 Jun 1996
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:548

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Papers 9132, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  2. Crawford, Vincent P & Haller, Hans, 1990. "Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 571-95, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-50, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1991. "Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 885-910, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Tilman Borgers & Rajiv Sarin, 1993. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-47, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  7. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1997. "Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 46-76, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Crawford, Vincent P., 1991. "An "evolutionary" interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 25-59, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Brandenburger, Adam, 1992. "Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 83-101, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-48, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1983. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 362-72, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David K Levine, 1997. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2047, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Natalia Jiménez, 2007. "The dark side of friendship: envy," ThE Papers 07/07, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tilman Slembeck, 2000. "Learning in Economics: Where Do We Stand?," Microeconomics 0004007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "A Behavioral Approach to Learning in Economics - Towards an Economic Theory of Contingent Learning," Microeconomics 9905001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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