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A Behavioral Approach to Learning in Economics - Towards an Economic Theory of Contingent Learning

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Author Info
Tilman Slembeck (University of St.Gallen)

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Abstract

In economics, adjustment of behavior has traditionally been treated as a "black box." Recent approaches that focus on learning behavior try to model, test, and simulate specific adjustment mechanisms in specific environments (mostly in games). Results often critically depend on distinctive assumptions, and are not easy to generalize. This paper proposes a different approach that aims to allow for more general conclusions in a methodologically more compatible way. It is argued that the introduction of the main determinants of learning behavior as situational restrictions into the standard economic model may be a fruitful way to capture some important aspects of human behavior that have often been omitted in economic theory. Based on a simple model of learning behavior (learning loop), robust findings from psychology are used to explain behavior adjustment, and to identify its determinants (contingent learning). An integrative methodology is proposed where the "black box" is not opened, but instead the factors that determine what happens inside, and the limits imposed by theses factors can be analyzed and used for model building. The paper concludes with testable hypotheses about learning behavior in the context of economics.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 9905001.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 04 May 1999
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9905001

Note: Type of Document - PDF-File; prepared on IBM PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 31 ; figures: included. Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen, prepared for the EEA Annual Meeting, Berlin Sept. 1998, downloads
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Related research
Keywords: microeconomics game theory learning theory experiments

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1986. "Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S385-99, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining - Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game With Fixed Opponents," Experimental 9905002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1994. "Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 1-9, May.
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    Other versions:
  6. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. J. Van Huyck & R. Battalio & F. Rankin, 1996. "On the Evolution of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 548, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. North, Douglass C, 1994. "Economic Performance through Time," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 359-68, June.
  9. U. Witt, 2006. "Evolutionary Economics," Papers on Econonmics and Evolution 2006-05, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group. [Downloadable!]
  10. James B. Bullard, 1991. "Learning, rational expectations and policy: a summary of recent research," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 50-60. [Downloadable!]
  11. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S251-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Rapoport, Amnon & Seale, Darryl A. & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 111-136, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Camerer, Colin & Loewenstein, George & Weber, Martin, 1989. "The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1232-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Simon, Herbert A, 1978. "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 1-16, May.
  17. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith, 1982. "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1123-42, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Do Wealth Differences Affect Fairness Considerations?," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-13, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  2. Olivier Armantier, . "Does Wealth Affect Fairness Considerations?," Department of Economics Working Papers 01-05, SUNY-Stony Brook, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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