This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Camerer, Colin
Loewenstein, George
Weber, Martin

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed agents are assumed capable of reproducing the judgments of less-informed agents. The authors discuss a systematic violation of this assumption that they call the "curse of knowledge." Better-informed agents are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their interest to do so; more information is not always better. Comparing judgments made in individual-level and market experiments, they find that market forces reduce the curse by approximately 50 percent, but do not eliminate it. Implications for bargaining, strategic behavior by firms, principal-agent problems, and choice under uncertainty are discussed. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198910%2997%3A5%3C1232%3ATCOKIE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 97 (1989)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 1232-54
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:5:p:1232-54

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637
Fax: (773) 753-0811
Email:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/home.html

Order Information:
Web: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/order1.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. BIAIS, Bruno & WEBER, Martin, 2008. "Hindsight Bias and Investment Performance," IDEI Working Papers 476, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lauren Munyan & Colin F. Camerer, 2005. "Code Creation in Endogenous Merger Experiments," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000056, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Biais, Bruno & Hilton, Denis & Pouget, Sébastien, 2002. "Psychological Traits and Trading Strategies," CEPR Discussion Papers 3195, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. George Loewenstein & Don Moore & Roberto Weber, 2006. "Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 281-295, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Pamela Schmitt, 2004. "On Perceptions of Fairness: The Role of Valuations, Outside Options, and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 49-73, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rode, Julian, 2007. "Truth and Trust in Communication: An Experimental Study of Behavior under Asymmetric Information," Ratio Working Papers 111, The Ratio Institute. [Downloadable!]
  7. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "A Behavioral Approach to Learning in Economics - Towards an Economic Theory of Contingent Learning," Microeconomics 9905001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Fiore, Annamaria, 2009. "Experimental Economics: Some Methodological Notes," MPRA Paper 12498, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Virginia Economics Online Papers 347, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Rami Zwick & Ching Chyi Lee, 1999. "Bargaining and Search: An Experimental Study," Experimental 9902003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Rode, Julian, 2008. "Truth and trust in communication - Experiments on the effect of a competitive context," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  12. Lybbert, Travis J. & Barrett, Christopher & McPeak, John G. & Luseno, Winnie K., 2003. "Bayesian Herders: Asymmetric Updating Of Rainfall Beliefs In Response To External Forecasts," Working Papers 14762, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
  13. Anders Poulsen & Jonathan Tan, 2007. "Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: An experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 391-409, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Richard Arnott, 1992. "Information and Usage of Congestible Facilities Under Free Access," Discussion Papers 974, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  15. Menkhaus, Dale & Yakunina, Alla V. & Phillips, Owen R., 2001. "Bilateral Trading And The Curse Of Knowledge: An Experimental Economics Study," 2001 Annual Meeting, July 8-11, 2001, Logan, Utah 36127, Western Agricultural Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  16. Francesca Gino & Don A. Moore & Max H. Bazerman, 2008. "No harm, no foul: The outcome bias in ethical judgments," Harvard Business School Working Papers 08-080, Harvard Business School, revised Apr 2009. [Downloadable!]
  17. BIAIS, Bruno & HILTON, Denis & MAZURIER, Karine & POUGET, Sébastien, 2004. "Judgmental Overconfidence, Self-Monitoring and Trading Performance in an Experimental Financial Market," IDEI Working Papers 259, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Weber, Martin & Welfens, Frank, 2007. "How do Markets React to Fundamental Shocks? An Experimental Analysis on Underreaction and Momentum," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-42, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  19. Daniel J. Benjamin & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Thin-Slice Forecasts of Gubernatorial Elections," NBER Working Papers 12660, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann & Lee Chew Ging, 2004. "Coordination and Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study," Occasional Papers 6, Nottingham University Business School. [Downloadable!]
  21. Niklas Karlsson & George Loewenstein & Duane Seppi, 2009. "The ostrich effect: Selective attention to information," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 95-115, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.