Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Does Observation Influence Learning?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Olivier Armantier

    ()

Abstract

A common value auction experiment is run to compare the relative influence of observation and experience on learning. It is shown that the ex-post observation of opponents' actions and payoffs homogenizes behavior and accelerates learning toward the Nash equilibrium. Besides, experiential and observational learning are both relevant and of comparable magnitude. A general reinforcement model for continuous strategies, encompassing choice reinforcement learning, direction learning and payoff dependent imitation, performs well in explaining the experimental data and it dominates competing models such as the reinforcement of best response strategies.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sunysb.edu/economics/research/papers/2001/01-04.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stony Brook University, Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 01-04.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:01-04

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Stony Brook, NY 11794-4384
Phone: (631)632-7540
Fax: (631)632-7516
Email:
Web page: http://www.stonybrook.edu/economics
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Offerman, T.J.S. & Potters, J.J.M. & Sonnemans, J., 2002. "Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91663, Tilburg University.
  2. Schlag, Karl H., 1996. "Which one should I imitate?," Discussion Paper Serie B 365, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
  4. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
  5. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C80-95, March.
  6. Klaus Abbink & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 25-57, 08.
  7. Armantier, Olivier, 2004. "Does observation influence learning?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 221-239, February.
  8. Antonio Cabrales & Walter Garcia Fontes, 2000. "Estimating learning models from experimental data," Economics Working Papers 501, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  9. Erev, Ido & Rapoport, Amnon, 1998. "Coordination, "Magic," and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 146-175, May.
  10. Stahl, Dale O., 2000. "Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 105-138, July.
  11. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  12. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July.
  13. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment to Equilibrium Under Noisy Directional Learning," Virginia Economics Online Papers 327, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  14. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
  15. Garvin, Susan & Kagel, John H., 1994. "Learning in common value auctions: Some initial observations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 351-372, December.
  16. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "A Behavioral Approach to Learning in Economics - Towards an Economic Theory of Contingent Learning," Microeconomics 9905001, EconWPA.
  17. John Duffy & Nick Feltovich, 1997. "Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 592, David K. Levine.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Marco Casari & John C. Ham & John H. Kagel, 2007. "Selection Bias, Demographic Effects, and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1278-1304, September.
  2. Guillaume Fréchette, 2012. "Session-effects in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 485-498, September.
  3. Fréchette, Guillaume R., 2009. "Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 153(2), pages 183-195, December.
  4. Olivier Armantier, 2001. "Does Observation Influence Learning?," Department of Economics Working Papers 01-04, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  5. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations," Department Discussion Papers 0706, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
  6. Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Do Wealth Differences Affect Fairness Considerations?," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-13, CIRANO.
  7. Dennis A. V. Dittrich & Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher & Paul Pezanis‐Christou, 2012. "Loss Aversion and Learning to Bid," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 79(314), pages 226-257, 04.
  8. Shafran, Aric P., 2012. "Learning in games with risky payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 354-371.
  9. Robert S. Gazzale, 2009. "Learning to Play Nash from the Best," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-03, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  10. Zacharias Maniadis & Joshua Miller, 2012. "The Weight of Personal Experience: an Experimental Measurement," Working Papers 452, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  11. Johanna Goertz, 2012. "Market composition and experience in common-value auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 106-127, March.
  12. Goeree, Jacob K. & Offerman, Theo & Schram, Arthur, 2006. "Using first-price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 555-581, May.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:01-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.