Loss Aversion and Learning to Bid
AbstractBidding challenges learning theories since experiences for the same bid vary stochastically: the same choice can result in a gain or a loss. In such an environment the question arises how the nearly universally documented phenomenon of loss aversion affects the adaptive dynamics. We analyze the impact of loss aversion in a simple auction for different learning theories. Our experimental results suggest that a version of reinforcement learning which accounts for loss aversion fares as well as more sophisticated alternatives.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 79 (2012)
Issue (Month): 314 (04)
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