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Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations

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Author Info
Alan Mehlenbacher () (Department of Economics, University of Victoria)
Abstract

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative auction research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents and provides an experimental environment that is under the experimenter's complete control. Simulations with alternative learning methods results in impulse balance learning as the most promising approach for auctions.

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File URL: http://web.uvic.ca/econ/ddp0706.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Victoria in its series Department Discussion Papers with number 0706.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 19 Nov 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vic:vicddp:0706

Note: ISSN 1914-2838
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PO Box 1700, STN CSC, Victoria, BC, Canada, V8W 2Y2
Phone: (250)721-8540
Fax: (250)721-6214
Web page: http://web.uvic.ca/econ
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Related research
Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining resource monotonicity transferable utility risk aversion

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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  1. Armantier, Olivier, 2004. "Does observation influence learning?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 221-239, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Li, Tong & Perrigne, Isabelle & Vuong, Quang, 2000. "Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 129-161, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  4. Andreoni James & Miller John H., 1995. "Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 39-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  7. Garvin, Susan & Kagel, John H., 1994. "Learning in common value auctions: Some initial observations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 351-372, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Neugebauer, Tibor & Selten, Reinhard, 2006. "Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 183-204, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 1999. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Working papers 99-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  12. Quang Vuong & Sandra Campo & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 179-207. [Downloadable!]
  13. Bower, John & Bunn, Derek, 2001. "Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 561-592, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Tong Li & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Timber Sale Auctions with Random Reserve Prices," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 189-200, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Dawid, Herbert, 1999. "On the convergence of genetic learning in a double auction market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 1545-1567, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2002. "Sequential bidding in auctions of construction contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 239-244, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2002. "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 137-188, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Sealed-Bid Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals," Department Discussion Papers 0707, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  19. Ohtsubo, Yohsuke & Rapoport, Amnon, 2006. "Depth of reasoning in strategic form games," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 31-47, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Dakshina G. De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2003. "An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 295-316, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Treasury Auctions," Department Discussion Papers 0709, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  22. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H & Wilson, Charles A, 1994. "Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1415-44, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  23. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Signal Averaging in English Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals," Department Discussion Papers 0708, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  24. Selten, Reinhard, 1998. "Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 413-436, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  25. Arifovic, Jasmina & McKelvey, Richard D. & Pevnitskaya, Svetlana, 2006. "An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 93-122, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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