This study uses a multiagent system to investigate how sealed-bid auction results vary across twodimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Victoria in its series Department Discussion Papers with number
0707.
Length: 51 pages Date of creation: 19 Nov 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:vic:vicddp:0707
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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