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Multiagent System Simulations of Treasury Auctions

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Author Info
Alan Mehlenbacher () (Department of Economics, University of Victoria)
Abstract

This study uses a multiagent system to determine which payment rule provides the most revenue in Treasury auctions that are based on Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment rule is revenue inferior to the Discriminatory payment rule across all market price spreads, but the Average rule is revenue superior. For most market-price spreads, Uniform payment results in less revenue than Discriminatory, but there are many cases in which Vickrey payment produces more revenue.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Victoria in its series Department Discussion Papers with number 0709.

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Length: 69 pages
Date of creation: 19 Nov 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vic:vicddp:0709

Note: ISSN 1914-2838
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Related research
Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining; resource monotonicity; transferable utility; risk aversion;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ali Hortacsu & Samita Sareen, 2005. "Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids: Information Flows and Strategic Behavior in the Government of Canada Securities Auctions," NBER Working Papers 11116, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2002. "Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 551.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Marco Arnone & George Iden, 2003. "Primary Dealers in Government Securities: Policy Issues and Selected Countries Experience," IMF Working Papers 03/45, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  4. Leonardo Bartolini & Carlo Cottarelli, 1997. "Designing effective auctions for treasury securities," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Jul. [Downloadable!]
  5. S. Viswanathan & James J. D. Wang, 2004. "Inter-Dealer Trading in Financial Markets," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(4), pages 987-1040, October. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Sealed-Bid Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals," Department Discussion Papers 0707, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  7. Chatterjea, Arkadev & Jarrow, Robert A., 1998. "Market Manipulation, Price Bubbles, and a Model of the U.S. Treasury Securities Auction Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(02), pages 255-289, June. [Downloadable!]
  8. Daripa, Arupratan, 2001. "A theory of treasury auctions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 743-767, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kjell G. Nyborg, 2004. "Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(2), pages 545-580. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Merrick, John Jr & Naik, Narayan Y. & Yadav, Pradeep K., 2005. "Strategic trading behavior and price distortion in a manipulated market: anatomy of a squeeze," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 171-218, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Chris D'Souza & Charles Gaa, 2004. "The Effects of Economic News on Bond Market Liquidity," Working Papers 04-16, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  13. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Signal Averaging in English Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals," Department Discussion Papers 0708, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations," Department Discussion Papers 0706, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
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