Multiagent System Simulations of Signal Averaging in English Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals
AbstractThis study uses a multiagent system to investigate English auctions with two-dimensional value signals and agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Victoria in its series Department Discussion Papers with number 0708.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 19 Nov 2007
Date of revision:
Note: ISSN 1914-2838
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Web page: http://web.uvic.ca/econ
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Axiomatic bargaining; resource monotonicity; transferable utility; risk aversion;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2007-11-24 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-11-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2007-11-24 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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