Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Leonardo Bartolini

Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its journal Current Issues in Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): (1997)
Issue (Month): Jul ()
Pages:
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:fip:fednci:y:1997:i:jul:n:v.3no.9

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045-0001
Email:
Web page: http://www.newyorkfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research

Keywords: Auctions ; Treasury bills ; Government securities;

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Treasury Auctions," Department Discussion Papers 0709, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
2. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2002. "Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 551.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Abbink, Klaus & Brandts, Jordi & Pezanis-Christou, Paul, 2006. "Auctions for government securities: A laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and Spanish designs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 284-303, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Orly Sade & Charles Schnitzlein & Jaime Zender, 2006. "Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination," Artefactual Field Experiments 0076, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
4. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Skully, David W., 1999. "The Economics Of Trq Administration," Working Papers 14584, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium. [Downloadable!]
6. Orly Sade & Charles Schnitzlein & Jaime F. Zender, 2004. "Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination," Working Papers 2004.15, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
7. Koesrindartoto, Deddy P., 2004. "Treasury Auctions, Uniform or Discriminatory?: An Agent-Based Approach," Staff General Research Papers 11988, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. S. M. Ali Abbas & Yuri Vladimirovich Sobolev, 2008. "High and Volatile Treasury Yields in Tanzania:The Role of Strategic Bidding and Auction Microstructure," IMF Working Papers 08/81, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]

Did you know? Authors can create their own profile with links to their works on the RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.