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Designing effective auctions for treasury securities

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  • Leonardo Bartolini
  • Carlo Cottarelli

Abstract

Most discussions of treasury auction design focus on the choice between two methods for issuing securities--uniform-price or discriminatory auctions. Although auction theory and much recent research appear to favor the uniform-price method, most countries conduct their treasury auctions using the discriminatory format. What are the main issues underlying the debate over effective auction design?

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its journal Current Issues in Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 3 (1997)
Issue (Month): Jul ()
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednci:y:1997:i:jul:n:v.3no.9

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Related research

Keywords: Auctions ; Treasury bills ; Government securities;

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Cited by:
  1. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Treasury Auctions," Department Discussion Papers 0709, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
  2. M S Mohanty, 2002. "Improving liquidity in government bond markets: what can be done?," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), The development of bond markets in emerging economies, volume 11, pages 49-80 Bank for International Settlements.
  3. Alvarez, Francisco & Mazon, Cristina, 2007. "Comparing the Spanish and the discriminatory auction formats: A discrete model with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(1), pages 253-266, May.
  4. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W25, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Bower, John & Bunn, Derek, 2001. "Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 561-592, March.
  6. Skully, David W., 1999. "The Economics Of Trq Administration," Working Papers 14584, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
  7. Orly Sade & Charles Schnitzlein & Jaime Zender, 2006. "Competition and cooperation in divisible good auctions: An experimental examination," Artefactual Field Experiments 00105, The Field Experiments Website.
  8. Orly Sade & Charles Schnitzlein & Jaime F. Zender, 2004. "Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination," Working Papers 2004.15, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  9. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2002. "Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 551.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  10. Yuri Vladimirovich Sobolev & S. M. Ali Abbas, 2008. "High and Volatile Treasury Yields in Tanzania," IMF Working Papers 08/81, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Koesrindartoto, Deddy P., 2004. "Treasury Auctions, Uniform or Discriminatory?: An Agent-Based Approach," Staff General Research Papers 11988, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

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