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Comparison of Auction Formats in Canadian Government Auctions

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  • Olivier Armantier
  • Nourredine Lafhel
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    Abstract

    Using a rich sample of Canadian government securities auctions, we estimate the structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders. We find little evidence of asymmetries between participants at Canadian government nominal bond auctions. A counter-factual analysis also suggests that given the assumptions underlying the model used, including that participation and quality of information are exogenous, the discriminatory format currently in place is superior to the uniform-price format in terms of the revenue generated by the Canadian government. Both auction formats, however, are found, under the same assumptions, to be dominated by the so-called "Spanish auction" format.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Bank of Canada in its series Working Papers with number 09-5.

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    Length: 37 pages
    Date of creation: 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:09-5

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    Keywords: Debt management; Financial markets; Market structure and pricing;

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    1. Pakes, Ariel & Pollard, David, 1989. "Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1027-57, September.
    2. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
    3. Abbink, Klaus & Brandts, Jordi & Pezanis-Christou, Paul, 2006. "Auctions for government securities: A laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and Spanish designs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 284-303, October.
    4. Erwann Sba� & Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 745-779.
    5. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. McFadden, Daniel, 1989. "A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response Models without Numerical Integration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 995-1026, September.
    7. Singleton, Kenneth J., 1985. "Testing specifications of economic agents' intertemporal optimum problems in the presence of alternative models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 391-413.
    8. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-64.
    9. Tenorio, Rafael, 1993. "Revenue Equivalence and Bidding Behavior in a Multi-unit Auction Market: An Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(2), pages 302-14, May.
    10. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
    11. Olivier ARMANTIER & Erwann SBAÏ, 2009. "Comparison of Alternative Payment Mechanisms for French Treasury Auctions," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 93-94, pages 135-160.
    12. Loretta J. Mester, 1995. "There's more than one way to sell a security: the Treasury's auction experiment," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Jul, pages 3-17.
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