The Treasury's Experiment with Single-Price Auctions in the Mid-1970s: Winner's or Taxpayer's Curse?
AbstractThis study examines the Treasury's experiment with single-price bond auctions in the mid-1970s and finds that, controlling for factors unrelated to auction technique, markups of auction average rates over when-issued rates shortly after auctions were a statistically significant seven to eight basis points higher at single-price auctions than at discriminating-price auctions. These results suggest that single-price auctions raised Treasury borrowing costs by roughly 3/4 percent of the issuing price of auctioned securities. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics & Statistics.
Volume (Year): 76 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Kondrát, Zsolt, 1996.
"Az aukciós módszer hatása a kincstár bevételére
[The impact of the auction method on the revenues of the Treasury]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 506-524.
- Preget, Raphaele & Waelbroeck, Patrick, 2005. "Treasury bill auction procedures: Empirical perspectives from French market bid functions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 1054-1072, November.
- Abbink, Klaus & Brandts, Jordi & Pezanis-Christou, Paul, 2006.
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier,
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- Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2002. "Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (UAB) and Institut d'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (CSIC) 551.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
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