What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach
AbstractWe develop a nonparametric approach that allows for discrimination among alternative models of entry in first-price auctions. Three models of entry are considered: those of Levin and Smith (1994), Samuelson (1985), and a new model in which the information received at the entry stage is imperfectly correlated with bidder valuations. We derive testable restrictions of these models based on how the pro-competitive selection effect shifts bidder valuation quantiles in response to an increase in the number of potential bidders.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number marmer-07-11-22-02-26-44.
Length: 56 pages
Date of creation: 22 Nov 2007
Date of revision: 18 Feb 2011
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First-price auctions; models of entry; selective entry; selection effect; nonparametric estimation; quantiles;
Other versions of this item:
- Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2013. "What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 176(1), pages 46-58.
- C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
- C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-12-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ECM-2007-12-01 (Econometrics)
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- De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pagel, Beatrice & Peeters, Ronald, 2010.
"The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs,"
27355, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dakshina De Silva & Georgia Kosmopoulou & Beatrice Pagel & Ronald Peeters, 2013. "The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 321-343, May.
- De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pagel, Beatrice & Peeters, Ronald, 2012. "The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs," DICE Discussion Papers 54, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Hanming Fang & Xun Tang, 2011. "Inference of Bidders’ Risk Attitudes in Ascending Auctions with Endogenous Entry, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 17 Apr 2012.
- Matthew Gentry & Tong Li, 2012. "Identifcation in auctions with selective entry," CeMMAP working papers CWP38/12, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Nianqing Liu & Quang Vuong & Haiqing Xu, 2012. "Rationalization and Identification of Discrete Games with Correlated Types," Department of Economics Working Papers 130915, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics.
- James W. Roberts & Andrew Sweeting, 2011. "When Should Sellers Use Auctions?," NBER Working Papers 17624, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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