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Structural Analysis of Auction Data

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Author Info
Laffont, Jean-Jacques
Vuong, Quang

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 86 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 414-20
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:86:y:1996:i:2:p:414-20

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  1. Burton Hollifield & Robert A. Miller & patrik Sandas, . "An Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 29-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Elena Krasnokutskaya, 2004. "Identification and Estimation in Highway Procurement Auctions under Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  3. Katharina Sailer, 2006. "Searching the eBay Marketplace," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Xun Tang, 2008. "Bounds on Revenue Distributions in Counterfactual Auctions with Reserve Prices," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-042, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  5. Daniel McFadden, 2001. "Economic Choices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 351-378, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001045, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. repec:att:wimass:1920013 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Tostao, Emilio & Chung, Chanjin & Brorsen, B. Wade, 2006. "Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21244, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  9. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," NBER Working Papers 9889, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2003. "Bidding Rings and the Winner's Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," NBER Working Papers 9836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Xin Wang & Ye Hu, 2009. "The effect of experience on Internet auction bidding dynamics," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 245-261, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Pierre Dubois & Marc Ivaldi & Thierry Magnac, 2008. "Introduction to the special issue on the Econometrics of Auctions," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 867-869. [Downloadable!]
  13. Hollifield, Burton & Miller, Robert & Sandås, Patrik, 2001. "Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2001. "Econometric Models of Asymmetric Ascending Auctions," Economics Working Paper Archive 453, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Quang Vuong & Sandra Campo & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 179-207. [Downloadable!]
  16. van den Berg, Gerard J & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2007. "If Winning Isn't Everything, Why Do They Keep Score? A Structural Empirical Analysis of Dutch Flower Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6323, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Reiss, Peter C. & Wolak, Frank A., 2003. "Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization," Research Papers 1831, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  18. Cantillon, Estelle & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6083, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Kenneth Hendricks & Joris Pinkse & Robert H. Porter, 2001. "Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions," NBER Working Papers 8294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE Working Papers 2008-64, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
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  21. Philippe Février, 2008. "Nonparametric identification and estimation of a class of common value auction models," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 949-964. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.


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