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Learning in common value auctions: Some initial observations

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Author Info
Garvin, Susan
Kagel, John H.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 25 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 351-372
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:25:y:1994:i:3:p:351-372

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  1. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, . "Signaling and Countersignaling: A Theory of Understatement," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-21, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations," Department Discussion Papers 0706, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  3. Stefan Klonner, 2003. "Empirical Analysis of Rosca Auctions in a South Indian Village," Working Papers 854, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dennis A. V. Dittrich & Werner Güth & Martin Kocher & Paul Pezanis-Christou, . "Loss aversion and learning to bid," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-03, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rosemarie Nagel & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 1997. "An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game," Economics Working Papers 230, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2002. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Erik Eyster & Matt Rabin, 2003. "Cursed Equilibrium," Method and Hist of Econ Thought 0303002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Georgia Kosmopoulou & Dakshina G. De Silva, 2005. "The Effect of Shill Bidding upon Prices: Experimental Evidence," Experimental 0512002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Marco Casari & John C. Ham & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments," Staff Reports 213, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Timothy Cason & Daniel Friedman, 1999. "Learning in a Laboratory Market with Random Supply and Demand," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 77-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000604, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996. "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series 39, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
  13. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Virginia Economics Online Papers 347, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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