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Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions

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Author Info
Li, Tong
Perrigne, Isabelle
Vuong, Quang
Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VC0-40V4D1C-F/2/2c3094880f6a65c799f531f68240e99f
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Econometrics.

Volume (Year): 98 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 129-161
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Handle: RePEc:eee:econom:v:98:y:2000:i:1:p:129-161

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  1. Sudip Gupta, 2004. "Endogenous Asymmetry and Entry in Sequential Multi-Unit Auctions: Identification and Estimation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 566, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2001. "Econometric Models of Asymmetric Ascending Auctions," Economics Working Paper Archive 453, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations," Department Discussion Papers 0706, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  4. Quang Vuong & Sandra Campo & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 179-207. [Downloadable!]
  5. repec:bep:jioedu:1:2006:1:5 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. William C. Horrace & Christopher F. Parmeter, 2008. "Semiparametric Deconvolution with Unknown Error Variance," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 104, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Yingyao Hu & Matthew Shum, 2007. "Estimating First-Price Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders: A Misclassification Approach," Economics Working Paper Archive 541, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Henderson, Daniel J. & List, John A. & Millimet, Daniel L. & Parmeter, Christopher F. & Price, Michael K., 2008. "Imposing Monotonicity Nonparametrically in First-Price Auctions," MPRA Paper 8769, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001045, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Lu Ji & Tong Li, 2008. "Multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve prices: theory and evidence," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 897-923. [Downloadable!]
  11. Tong Li & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2006. "Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions," CeMMAP working papers CWP13/06, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  12. Kenneth Hendricks & Joris Pinkse & Robert H. Porter, 2001. "Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions," NBER Working Papers 8294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Philippe Février, 2008. "Nonparametric identification and estimation of a class of common value auction models," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 949-964. [Downloadable!]
  14. Gino Loyola, 2008. "On bidding markets: the role of competition," Economics Working Papers we083318, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  15. Pierre Dubois & Marc Ivaldi & Thierry Magnac, 2008. "Introduction to the special issue on the Econometrics of Auctions," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 867-869. [Downloadable!]
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