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Combinatorial Auctions

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Author Info
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)
Yoav Shoham ()
Richard Steinberg ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions?auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem?how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses implementation and methods of testing the performance of combinatorial auctions, including simulation and experiment. Part V considers four important applications: airport runway access, trucking, bus routes, and industrial procurement. The chapters develop and apply a unified language, integrating ideas from economics, operations research, and computer science. A glossary defines the central terms. The contributors are Lawrence Ausubel, Michael Ball, Martin Bichler, Sushil Bikhchandani, Craig Boutilier, Estelle Cantillon, Chris Caplice, Peter Cramton, Andrew Davenport, George Donohue, Karla Hoffman, Gail Hohner, Jayant Kalagnanam, Ailsa Land, Daniel Lehmann, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Dinesh Menon, Paul Milgrom, Rudolf Müller, Noam Nisan, Eugene Nudelman, Joseph Ostroy, David Parkes, Aleksandar Pekec, Martin Pesendorfer, Susan Powell, Amir Ronen, Michael Rothkopf, Tuomas Sandholm, Ilya Segal, Yossi Sheffi, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg, Susara van den Heever, Thomas Wilson, and Makoto Yokoo.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/combinatorial-auctions-book-public.htm
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 04mit.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 700 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision: 2004
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Related research
Keywords: Auctions Combinatorial Auctions Market Design

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Peters Hans & Vermeulen Dries, 2006. "WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions," Research Memoranda 021, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations," Department Discussion Papers 0706, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  3. Lok,Reinder B. & Romero Morales,Dolores & Vermeulen,Dries, 2005. "The Agents-are-Substitutes Property in Continuous Generalized Assignment Problems," Research Memoranda 008, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter Cramton, 2005. "How Best to Auction Oil Rights," Papers of Peter Cramton 06oil, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  5. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Cantillon, Estelle & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6083, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Liad Blumrosen & Noam Nisan, 2005. "On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions I: Demand Queries," Discussion Paper Series dp381, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  8. Goossens D.R. & Müller R. & Spieksma F.C.R., 2007. "Matrix bids in combinatorial auctions: expressiveness and micro-economic properties," Research Memoranda 016, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  9. Paul Milgrom, 2007. "Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001454, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Müller Rudolf & Perea Andrés & Wolf Sascha, 2007. "Combinatorial Scoring Auctions," Research Memoranda 020, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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