Blume, Andreas () (University of Iowa) Gneezy, Uri (University of Haifa)
Abstract
This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee for it to be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
98-10.
Length: 11 Pages Date of creation: Sep 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:98-10
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242 Phone: (319) 335-0829 Fax: (319) 335-1956 Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/ More information through EDIRC
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