This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The effect of sharing rules on group competition

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Anna Gunnthorsdottir (Australian Graduate School of Management)
Amnon Rapoport (University of Arizona)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We consider embedding independent within-group conflicts for the provision of public goods in a between-group competition for an exogenously determined prize as a structural mechanism for reducing free riding. We model this situation by a multi-level collective action game in which the group<92>s probability of wining the prize is proportional to its contribution, and the profit sharing rule that determines how to divide the prize among members of the winning group is either egalitarian or proportional to the individual contributions. Under appropriate parameterization of the payoff structure, zero contribution by individual members is no longer the equilibrium solution, and equilibrium contributions are substantially higher when the profit sharing rule is proportional rather than egalitarian. Our experimental results support the equilibrium predictions. A simple reinforcement- learning model accounts for the dynamics of play on the aggregate but not individual level.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/exp/papers/0307/0307003.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number 0307003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 345 pages
Date of creation: 28 Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0307003

Note: Type of Document - Tex/WordPerfect/Handwritten; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX/UNIX Sparc TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 345,395,4323247 ; figures: included/request from author/draw your own
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords: group competition public good

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lee, Sanghack, 1995. " Endogenous Sharing Rules in Collective-Group Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(1-2), pages 31-44, October.
  3. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bornstein, Gary & Winter, Eyal & Goren, Harel, 1996. "Experimental study of repeated team-games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 629-639, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Descriptive Approaches to Cooperation," Discussion Paper Serie B 292, University of Bonn, Germany.
  6. Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 605-642, May.
  7. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
  8. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Hausken, Kjell, 1995. "The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 655-687. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. " Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
  12. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Shogren, Jason F, 1995. " Competitive-Share Group Formation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 113-26, April.
  13. Dale O. Stahl, 1999. "Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 111-130. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Rapoport, Amnon & Seale, Darryl A. & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 111-136, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997. "Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Cox, James C. & Shachat, Jason & Walker, Mark, 2001. "An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 11-33, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Andereoni, J., 1988. "Why Free Ride? Strategies And Learning In Public Goods Experiments," Working papers 375, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  19. Sarin, Rajiv & Vahid, Farshid, 2001. "Predicting How People Play Games: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 104-122, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Palfrey, Thomas R & Prisbrey, Jeffrey E, 1997. "Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 829-46, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Andreoni, James, 1995. "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-904, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. R. Isaac & James Walker, 1998. "Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 191-206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.