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The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction

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  • Hausken, Kjell

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  • Hausken, Kjell, 1995. "The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 655-687.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:24:y:1995:i:7:p:655-687
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    1. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-1534, November.
    2. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
    3. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. "Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
    4. Juan Carlos Martinez Coll & Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "The Limits of Reciprocity: Solution Concepts and Reactive Strategies in Evolutionary Equilibrium Models," UCLA Economics Working Papers 577, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Juan Carlos Martinez Coll & Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Limits of Reciprocity," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(1), pages 35-64, January.
    6. P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
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