Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Charles A. Holt

Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
This chapter was published in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.) , Elsevier, chapter 84, pages 792-801, 2008.

This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Experimental Economics Results with number 6-84.

Handle: RePEc:eee:expchp:6-84

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevierdirect.com/product.jsp?isbn=9780444826428

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research

This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), 2008. "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 6, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Anna Gunnthorsdottir & Amnon Rapoport, 2003. "The effect of sharing rules on group competition," Experimental 0307003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
2. R. Isaac & James Walker, 1998. "Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 191-206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Marc Willinger & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2001. "Strength of the Social Dilemma in a Public Goods Experiment: An Exploration of the Error Hypothesis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 131-144, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Lisa R. Anderson & Jennifer M. Mellor & Jeffrey Milyo, 2003. "Inequality, Group Cohesion, and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 0308, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jeffrey Milyo & Jennifer M. Mellor & Lisa Anderson, 2004. "Inequality, Group Cohesion, and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 0418, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 27 Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
5. John Spraggon, 2003. "Exogenous Targeting Instruments with Heterogeneous Agents," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 2003-02, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
6. Marco Casari, 2004. "Can Genetic Algorithms Explain Experimental Anomalies?," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 257-275, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Kurtis Swope, 2002. "An Experimental Investigation of Excludable Public Goods," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 209-222, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehiko Yamato & Konomu Yokotani, 2003. "Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments revised October 2003, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior," Discussion papers 03011, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
9. Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, 2009. "Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence," Discussion Papers 2009-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, 2009. "Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
10. Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo & Ostrom, Elinor, 2004. "What do people bring into the game: experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons," CAPRi working papers 32, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Juan Camilo Cardenas & Elinor Ostrom, 2004. "What do people bring into the game? experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons," Artefactual Field Experiments 0023, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    • Cardenas, Juan-Camilo & Ostrom, Elinor, 2004. "What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 307-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 1999. "Altruism and Noisy Behavior in One-Shot Public Goods Experiments," Virginia Economics Online Papers 331, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
12. Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2003. "Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000027, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko & Yokotani, Konomu & Cason, Timothy N., 2002. "Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments," Working Papers 1154, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    • Cason, Timothy N. & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko & Yokotani, Konomu, 2004. "Non-excludable public good experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 81-102, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Joel Waldfogel, 2003. "Social Learning and Coordination in High-Stakes Games: Evidence from Friend or Foe," CREMA Working Paper Series 2003-01, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Joel Waldfogel & Matthew White, 2003. "Social Learning and Coordination in High-Stakes Games: Evidence from Friend or Foe," NBER Working Papers 9805, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-8.