Predicting how People Play Games: a Simple Dynamic Model of Choice
AbstractWe use the model developed in Sarin and Vahid (1999, GEB) to explain the experiments reported in Erev and Roth (1998, AER). The model supposes that players maximize subject to their "beliefs" which are non-probabilistic and scalar-valued. They are intended to describe the payoffs the players subjectively assess they will obtain from a strategy. In an earlier paper (Sarin and Vahid (1997) we showed that the model predicted behaviour in repeated coordination games remarkably well, and better than equilibrium theory of reinforcement learning models. In this paper we show that the same one-parameter model can also explain behaviour in games with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium better than alternative models. Hence, we obtain further support for the simple dynamic model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Monash University, Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics in its series Monash Econometrics and Business Statistics Working Papers with number 12/99.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2001), 34, 104-122.
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Postal: PO Box 11E, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia
Web page: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/depts/ebs/
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Other versions of this item:
- Sarin, Rajiv & Vahid, Farshid, 2001. "Predicting How People Play Games: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 104-122, January.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-04-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2002-04-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2002-05-01 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
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- Tilman B�rgers & Rajiv Sarin, . "Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspiration," ELSE working papers 037, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
- Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
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